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FOREWORD:
WHY POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY REQUIRES THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
TO CHALLENGE “IRRATIONAL OR ARBITRARY” STATUTES
RANDY E. BARNETT ∗
ABSTRACT: So-called “substantive due process” has long been criticized
progressives and conservatives as a contradictory interpretation of the Due
Process Clauses, and one that undermines the popular sovereignty of We the
People to govern themselves. In this Foreword, I explain why an individual
conception of We the People, leads to a “republican” conception of popular
sovereignty that requires a neutral magistrate to adjudicate whether a statute
restricting the liberties of the We the People is within the just powers of a
legislature to enact. Because a measure that is ultra vires is not truly “a law,”
enforcing it against a fellow citizen and joint sovereign so as to deprive that person
of his or her “life, liberty or property” violates what should be called the Due
Process of Law Clauses. While the proper ends of Congress’s powers are
enumerated in the text of the Constitution, the police powers of the states are more
general. Still, the exercise of such powers to restrict the privileges or immunities of
citizens in an “irrational or arbitrary” manner is beyond the just powers that a
sovereign people can be presumed or supposed to have delegated to their servants
in the legislature. Courts, who are also servants of the We the People, readily
perform this type of evaluation when a “fundamental right” or “suspect class” is
affected by the exercise of the police power, so such judicial engagement is well
within their competence.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma was a subsidiary of a Texas company that owned
a national chain of eyeglass retailers doing business the way Lenscrafters does
today. Lee Optical was founded by Theodore Shanbaum, whose parents were
Russian immigrants who had settled in Chicago. 1 After graduating from the
University of Chicago, he earned his law degree from DePaul in the late 1930s. 2
After visiting his brother-in-law, an optometrist, at his home in Dallas, Shanbaum
got the idea of entering into the eyeglass industry himself. 3 To save money, he
purchased a used business sign that said “LEE OPTICAL.” The name “Lee” had no
other connection to the enterprise. 4

∗

Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center for the
Constitution. This Foreword was prepared for the Symposium on “Is the Rational Basis Test
Unconstitutional?” Which was held at Georgetown Law on February 11, 2016 and co-sponsored
with the Institute for Justice. Portions of this Foreword are drawn from Chapters 3 and 9 of RANDY
E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE
THE PEOPLE (2016). I thank Alexa Gervasi for her assistance in preparing this Foreword.
1
Obituary of Theodore Shanbaum, Dallas Morning News, October 6, 1999.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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It should come as no surprise that local ophthalmologists and optometrists
were none too keen on this out-of-state competition advertising lower prices on
glasses replaced without a new prescription the way LensCrafters does today.
Indeed, most of the famous economic liberty cases involve legislation siding with
some firms in competition with others.
•
•
•
•
•

In the Slaughter-House Cases, 5 the statute gave special monopoly
privileges to a single designated corporation at the expense of individual
butchers.
In Lochner v. New York, 6 the statute promoted by the bakeshop union
favored union-organized bakeries at the expense of small, ethnic, nonunion
bakeshops.
In Muller v. Oregon, 7 white male union members were protected from
competition from women.
In Nebbia v. New York,8 the regulation raising the retail price of milk sought
to protect big milk distributors from competition from small mom-and-pop
retailers in poor neighborhoods.
In U.S. v. Carolene Products, 9 the statute protected the powerful dairy
constituency from competition from lower-priced and better-tasting “filled”
milk.

And these are just the famous “landmark” cases of economic regulation.
So it is unsurprising that the Oklahoma legislature passed a law banning
opticians from providing certain eyeglass services in competition with
ophthalmologists and optometrists, effectively making Lee Optical’s business plan
illegal. What is surprising is that the federal district court upheld Lee Optical’s Due
Process Clause challenge to the statute, though it was 1954 and well after the New
Deal revolution. A three-judge panel agreed that the statutory scheme was irrational
and arbitrary, and that none of the restrictions enacted could realistically be justified
as genuine health and safety measures. 10
In 1955, however, when the case reached the Warren Court, the justices
reversed. In his opinion for the Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 11 Justice
William O. Douglas finally adopted the extreme deferential standard that had been

5

83 U.S. 36 (1873).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
8
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
9
304 U.S. 144 (1938)
10
For a description of how the lower court realistically assessed the statute before concluding it
violated the Due Process Clause, see RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION:
SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 234-41 (2016).
11
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
6
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urged by James Bradley Thayer 12 and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 13—the formalist
approach that even Justice Brandeis and his New Deal Court colleagues had
declined to expressly adopt in Caroline Products. 14
In this Foreword, I explain why the individual sovereignty of We the
People, each and every one, requires the “due process of law,” which includes a
process by which statutes and regulations restricting liberty may be challenged for
being “irrational or arbitrary.” Such exercises of legislative power are beyond the
“just powers” of a republican legislature to enact because the people cannot be
presumed to have consented to being so governed.
The Limits of the “Consent of the Governed”
As I explain in Our Republican Constitution, 15 from the early days of the
American republic, the fundamental nature of our government has been disputed.
This is because there are not one, but two conceptions of popular sovereignty, based
on, not one, but two very different notions of “We the People.”
Some view “We the People” collectively, believing that popular sovereignty
resides in the people as a group, which favors rule by today’s majority. Their vision
of a good constitution is a living one, as the people should not be ruled by the dead
hand of past majorities. Under this, what I call the “Democratic Constitution,”
unelected judges are then seen as thwarting the “will of the People.”
Then there are those who view “We the People” individually, and who think
popular sovereignty resides in the people as individuals. Their vision of
government is not to reflect the will of the people—which in practice means the
will of the majority—but to secure the pre-existing rights of We the People, each
and every one of us. Under what I call the “Republican Constitution,” judges are
seen as servants of the sovereign people who are tasked with protecting their
liberties from majoritarian abuses by the subset of the people who are tasked with
make laws for the common good.
In Our Republican Constitution, I describe these two competing
conceptions of popular sovereignty based on two contrasting visions of “We the
People,” and explain how the individualist conception of popular sovereignty is
manifested in the Declaration of Independence’s famous declaration that: “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty

12

James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 17 (1893).
13
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14
I discuss the history of the rise, fall, and partial revival of judicial scrutiny in Randy E. Barnett,
Scrutiny Land, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1479, 1481-1485 (2008).
15
See generally BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (contrasting the “republican” and
“democratic” conceptipns of We the People and popular sovereignty). .
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and the pursuit of Happiness.” 16 It then affirmed “[t]hat to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men. . . .” 17
Thus, under the Declaration’s view of republicanism, first come rights and
then comes government “to secure these rights.” But that famous sentence then
continues to describe governments as “deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.” 18 This last passage of the sentence has proven to be problematic
when combined with the first.
If the “consent of the governed” is taken to mean the consent of a majority
of the people, then the “consent of the governed” can be used to violate the
“unalienable rights” that “governments are instituted among Men” “to secure.” The
situation is still worse if the consent of a majority of a small body of men and
women called “legislators” and “representatives” is taken to be the same as the
consent of the people themselves. The problem with the “collective” conception of
popular sovereignty based on “the will of the people” is that it invites this
majoritarian interpretation of the “consent of the governed.” For it would seem that
the “will” of “We the People” could not be identified in any other way. After all,
the citizenry will never be unanimous about anything.
Suppose, however, that the flaw in this reasoning is to insist that popular
sovereignty entails rule by the people themselves. Rather, rule is by
“governments...instituted among Men,” who are not to be confused with the people
themselves. What the people must consent to is the scheme of governance, not to
the individual laws that may be imposed upon them. And yet, each “joint
sovereign” individual is never asked for his or her explicit consent even to that
scheme. The Constitution itself was only ratified by a majority of elected delegates
to state ratification conventions.
So how do we reconcile the individual conception of popular sovereignty
based on the consent of each and every person with the fact that such unanimous
consent to governance is never expressly solicited, and would be impossible to
obtain? If the only reason “a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds
himself,” as Justice James Wilson insisted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 19 in what sense
can an individual who is never asked for his or her consent be said to have consented
to be governed?
As it happens, there was an answer to this question that can also be found
at the time of the founding and long before. If we start with the republican
proposition that it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and that they
retain their preexisting rights while delegating powers to their agents, then, in the
absence of such express consent, we must ask what each person could be presumed
to have consented to.

16

Declaration of Independence. See also BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, ch. 1.
Declaration of Independence.
18
Id.
19
2 U.S. 419 (1793); see also Randy E. Barnett, We the People, Each and Every One, 123 Yale L.
J. 2576, 2596-602 (2014).
17
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In his 1845 book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, radical abolitionist
Lysander Spooner contended that, since the consent of the governed “exists only in
theory,” the people cannot be presumed to have given up their preexisting rights. 20
“Justice,” he said, “is evidently the only principle that everybody can be presumed
to agree to, in the formation of government.” 21 Although this is where I first noticed
the concept, Spooner was far from the first to make this argument, which crops up
in some interesting places.
In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke observed that “men,
when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they
had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by
the legislative, as the good of the society shall require.” 22 He then considered the
limit to the legislative or police power that is given up, employing an analysis based
on “supposed” consent very similar to Spooner’s reference to “theoretical” consent:
[Y]et it being only with an intention in every one the better to
preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature
can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be
worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them,
can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but
is obliged to secure every one’s property, by providing against those
three defects . . . that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. 23
In the absence of any explicit consent from the individual, like Spooner,
Locke asked what a “rational creature can be supposed” to have consented to when
leaving the state of nature. And the individual can only be “supposed” to have
consented to the common good, which consists of the protection of each person’s
life, liberty, and property.
This idea of “supposed” or presumed consent appears again in an official
opinion of our first attorney general of the United States, Edmund Randolph.
President Washington had queried each member of his cabinet as to whether the
Constitution gave Congress an implied power to incorporate a national bank. 24 In
his opinion to the President, Randolph observed that a legislature governed by a
written constitution without an express “demarcation of powers, may perhaps, be
presumed to be left at large, as to all authority which is communicable by the
people,” provided that such authority “does not affect any of those paramount
rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their

20

Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, rev. ed. (1860), reprinted in The Collected
Works of Lysander Spooner, vol. 4, ed. Charles Shively (Weston, MA: M&S Press, 1971), 225.
21
Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
22
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, §131.
23
Id. (emphasis added).
24
Edmund Randolph, “Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to
President Washington,” in Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States,
ed. M. St. Clair Clarke and D.A. Hall (New York, 1832), 86.
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representatives.” 25 Once again, given the sovereignty of the people as individuals,
the people cannot be “presumed” or “supposed” to have confided in their legislature
any power to violate their fundamental rights.
But perhaps the most striking use of this notion of the presumed or supposed
consent of the governed appears in the 1798 Supreme Court case Calder v. Bull. 26
Calder has become known for its clash between Justice Samuel Chase, who
invoked “the great first principles of the social compact,” which he said restrict the
“rightful exercise of legislative authority,” 27 and Justice James Iredell, who seemed
to assert a far more unlimited and positivist conception of legislative power.
Generally overlooked, however, is the fact that, like Locke, Randolph, and Spooner,
Chase too employed the notion of supposed or presumed consent in assessing the
proper scope of legislative power.
In a famous passage worth quoting in its entirety, Justice Chase began by
observing that even state legislatures of general powers without expressed limits
do not have unlimited power:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that
it is absolute and without control, although its authority should not
be expressly restrained by the constitution or fundamental law of the
state. The people of the United States erected their constitutions, or
forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their
persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men
enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social
compact, and as they are the foundation of the legislative power,
they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and
ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. . . . There are
acts which the federal or state legislature cannot do without
exceeding their authority. 28
Chase then provided examples of legislative acts that violate these “great
first principles,” such as a law “that punished a citizen for an innocent action,” or
“a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens,” or “a law
that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A.
and gives it to B.” 29 Such an “act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law)” was
beyond the legislative power, he said, because “[i]t is against all reason and justice,
for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot
be presumed that they have done it.” 30
25

Id. (emphasis added).
3 U.S. 386 (1798).
27
3 U.S. at 388 (Chase, J.)
28
Id. at 387-88 (emphases added).
29
Id.
30
Id.. (emphases added).
26
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In other words, just because a legislature enacts a statute does not
automatically make the statute a law. According to Chase, only laws that are
consistent with the proper “ends of legislative power” for which men into society
are properly called “law.” And a court may need to pass on the question of whether
or not a statute is a product of a “rightful exercise of legislative power.” If it isn’t,
then such a statute would deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without what
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments call the “due process of law.” Even if it is
enacted according to the established legislative procedures or “process,” a statute
that exceeds the just powers of the legislature to enact cannot properly be
considered a “law.” And, in the absence of his or her express consent, no person
can be presumed to have consented to being deprived of his or her life, liberty or
property except by a proper law. Like Locke, Chase asked whether, in the absence
of a clear statement in a written constitution, a free and rational person could have
consented to that.
Just seven years after Calder, Chief Justice John Marshall, in applying the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 31 adopted a similar “clear statement rule” with
respect to presumed legislative intent in the case of U.S. v. Fisher: “where
fundamental principles are overthrown, when the general system of the laws is
departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness
to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.” 32
To be sure, natural justice or natural rights lurk in the background of all
these considerations of “presumed consent” by Locke, Randolph, Chase, Marshall
and Spooner. But these rights are not identified and then directly protected as such.
Instead, the prior existence of such rights justifies skepticism about the claim of
implied legislative power in the absence of an express consent.
When combined with the concept of individual popular sovereignty, all
these invocations of “presumed,” “supposed,” or “theoretical” consent cast the
issue of popular sovereignty and the “consent of the governed” in a new light and
support the approach to constitutional legitimacy I presented in Restoring the Lost
Constitution. 33 The argument has the following steps:
•
•
•

First, ultimate sovereignty rests not in the government, but in the people
themselves, considered as individuals.
Second, to be legitimate, the government must receive the consent of all
these sovereign individuals.
Third, in the absence of an express consent by each person, the only implied
consent that can be attributed to everyone is a consent only to such powers
that do not violate their retained fundamental rights.

31
See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers,
1801-1835, 49 U. Chi L. Rev. 887, 930-32 (1982) (contrasting Marshall’s treatments of “necessary
and Proper” in Fisher and McCulloch).
32
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 358 (1805).
33
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY,
2d. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 369.
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Fourth, the equal protection of these rights retained by the people is what
assures them that the government is actually conforming to the consent that
it claims to be the source of its just powers.
Finally, only if such protection is effective will the commands of a
legislature bind in conscience on the individual.
The Due Process of Law and Judicial Engagement

In Our Republican Constitution, I explain how the structural features of
federalism and the separation of powers in our Constitution are the first line of
defense of the sovereignty of We the People. 34 Even here, however, an independent
judiciary is needed to keep political actors within these structural restraints.
Obtaining the benefits of federalism requires federal courts to develop doctrines
that identify the outer limits of Congress’s enumerated powers, as the Supreme
Court was attempting, however imperfectly, to do before 1937, and has tepidly done
since 1995. And the Court must overcome its reluctance to enforce the separation
of powers within the federal government—a reticence that has undermined the
rights of the sovereign people by allowing the rise of an executive-administrative
state with the prerogative powers of a sovereign king. 35
That a judiciary is needed to secure the structural features of the
Constitution should not be surprising. Recall John Locke’s assessment that the state
of nature is so “unsafe and uneasy,” in part because it lacks “a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law.” 36 This is because, when every person is “both judge and
executioner of the law of nature,” each “being partial to themselves, passion and
revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own
cases.” 37
As with individuals, Congress should not be the judge in its own case about
the extent of its powers, and the executive-administrative state has dangerously
become the legislator, judge, and executioner of its own prerogative powers. 38 No
one who views popular sovereignty as residing in the individual would confuse the
people themselves with their representatives in the legislature—or with employees
of administrative agencies—who are but men and women who may use their power
to improperly restrain the liberties of the sovereign people.
Although an independent judiciary standing alone is not enough to secure
the sovereignty of the people and is, in some sense, the last line of defense after the
structural protections of federalism and separation of powers, judges have an
34

See BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, ch. 6-8.
Id. Ch. 8.
36
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, §125.
37
Id. at §124.
38
See F. H. Buckley, The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America (New
York: Encounter Books, 2014); Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2014).
35
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important role to play in our republican constitution. As Madison explained in
Federalist 10, “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity.” 39 But he then added that the same precept applies to legislatures: “With
equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties
at the same time.” 40 Madison then observed that “many of the most important acts
of legislation” function as “judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens.” 41
According to Locke, the answer to this defect in the state of nature is the
creation of an impartial judiciary. Or, as Madison put it in his speech to the House
proposing a bill of rights, “independent tribunals of justice . . . will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the constitution. . . .” 42
As it happens, the right to a fair and impartial adjudication has been
“expressly stipulated for” in the Constitution, not once, but twice. Among the
express guarantees that were added to the Constitution is the Fifth Amendment,
which says that no “person . . . shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” 43 Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment says that no
state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” 44
Even when all the structural constraints are operating as designed—and
especially when they aren’t—there remains a need for a “due process of law” to
ensure that proper laws are applied properly to particular persons. But the “due
process of law” also requires a forum in which citizens may contest whether their
servants have exceeded their “just powers.” In this sense, a “Commerce Clause
challenge” to the scope of Congressional power is also part of the “due process of
law.” The same would be true for a “First Amendment challenge.”
The Commerce Clause provides, and the First Amendment reaffirms or
declares, a substantive limit on legislative power, while the Due Process of Law
Clauses either provide for (or reaffirm) a neutral magistrate to ensure that the agents
or servants of the sovereign individuals who comprise We the People are not acting
ultra vires. In such cases, we just see the Commerce Clause or First Amendment;
we do not notice that the “due process of law” assures citizens the opportunity for
their day in court when Congress has exceeded its power when restricting their
liberties. Chase in Calder explains why the “of law” part of the Clauses matters.

39

James Madison, “Federalist #10,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New
American Library, 1961), 77
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
The
Papers
of
James
Madison,
http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s50.html.
43
U.S. Const. amend. V.
44
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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Since the New Deal breached the enumerated powers scheme, judges began
employing the two Due Process of Law Clauses to protect certain “preferred
freedoms” or “fundamental rights.” 45 While some of these rights were enumerated
in the text of the Constitution, others that were unenumerated have been selected
by judges for special protection. This post-New Deal doctrine is then called
“substantive due process” because, rather than ensuring a fair process by which the
law is applied to particular persons, the “Due Process Clause” by itself is being used
to limit the scope of the legislature’s power by protecting certain substantive rights,
some of which are nowhere enumerated in the Constitution.
Judges and law professors today read this modern approach back into the
Supreme Court’s use of the Due Process of Law Clause before 1937. Like modern
courts, they say, in cases like Lochner v. New York 46 the pre–New Deal Supreme
Court improperly elevated the substantive right of the “liberty of contract” to the
status of a fundamental right. While today’s progressives on the left and “judicial
conservatives” on the right all condemn this use of the Due Process of Law Clauses,
they differ on why exactly it was wrong.
Like the New Deal justices who were dubbed “judicial activists” by Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., modern progressives say the sin was not that the Court was using
the Due Process of Law Clauses to protect “substantive” rights, but that it was
protecting the wrong substantive rights. Like these old “activists,” progressives
today say the problem is “not that the old Court engaged in judicial legislation, for
this is inevitable,” but “that it engaged in reactionary judicial legislation.” 47
Because “the Court cannot escape politics...let it use its political power for
wholesome purposes,” 48 such as protecting a right of privacy.
On the other side of the aisle, like the New Deal justices that Schlesinger
dubbed “Champions of Self Restraint,” modern judicial conservatives object to
using the Due Process of Law Clauses to thwart the will of the majority by
protecting any unenumerated right—whether the liberty of contract or a right of
privacy. By protecting unenumerated rights at all, they say, courts are engaged in
judicial lawmaking rather than confining themselves to ensuring a process in which
laws are fairly applied to particular individuals.
In this way, both today’s left and right are operating within the post–New
Deal worldview. But this seriously distorts how the pre–New Deal Supreme Court
was actually using the Due Process of Law Clauses. The pre–New Deal justices
were not selecting certain “substantive” unenumerated rights and then elevating
them for special protection. Instead, they viewed the “due process of law” as
requiring a procedure by which a person who is deprived of his or her life, liberty,
or property may challenge a law as outside the “just powers” of Congress or state
legislators to enact.

45

See Barnett, Scrutiny Land, supra note 15, at 1480.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “The Supreme Court: 1947,” Fortune, January 1947, 202.
48
Id.
46
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In other words, before sovereign individuals can justly be deprived of their
“life” (by capital punishment), “liberty” (by imprisonment), or “property” (by
penalty or fine), the “due process of law” entitles them to a judicial evaluation of
whether a statute being enforced against them is within the “just powers” of
Congress or state legislatures to enact. And the “due process of law” requires that
such a statute be a “law.” As we saw above, thus did Justice Chase insist “An ACT
of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority.” Unless a statute is consistent with these principles for which “free
republican governments” are established, it is not truly “a law” that is binding in
conscience on the sovereign individual.
Under “the due process of law,” then, the process of applying a law to a
particular person includes a fair opportunity to contest whether a statute (or
administrative regulation) is within the “proper” or “just power” of a legislature to
enact and therefore carries the obligation of a law. And, like a law that exceeds the
commerce power of Congress, an irrational or arbitrary statute is not within the just
powers of a republican legislature.
Crucially, the “due process of law” requires that the magistrate or judge
hearing such a challenge be impartial. If the judge hearing a challenge simply
“presumes” that the legislature is acting properly, or “defers” to the legislature’s
own assessment of its powers, then that judge is not acting impartially. Even worse,
if the “presumption” in favor of legislation is irrebuttable, then the person dressed
in black robes is not acting as a judge at all.
When this happens, “fellow citizens and joint sovereigns” 49—the term used
by Chief Justice John Jay in Chisholm 50—will be deprived of their “life, liberty, or
property” without “the due process of law.” And without this aspect of the due
process of law, the benefits of federalism, separation of powers, the freedom of
speech, and all the other structural and substantive protections afforded by our
Republican Constitution will be severely weakened or altogether lost. But what
about the states?
“Irrational or Arbitrary” State Statutes
The original Constitution placed very few limits on the scope of the
legislative or “internal police” of the states. In Calder, Justice Chase was
considering the proper scope of state legislative power because the case concerned
one of these limits. Article I, Section 9 says: “No state shall pass any bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant
49

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), at 479.
Id. (“The extension of the judiciary power of the United States to such controversies [those
between States and citizens of another State] . . . enforces this great and glorious principle, that the
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any title of nobility.” 51 Nevertheless, for Chase, this express limitation on state
power merely confirmed the fundamental Republican principle that the people
“cannot be presumed” to have delegated to their state legislatures a power to impose
arbitrary or irrational restrictions on their natural liberties. Moreover, the
Fourteenth Amendment provided a new republican check on state powers. Using
wording deliberately mimicking Article I, Section 9, it commands: “No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” 52
Of course, the scope of state legislative power differs from that of the
national government. While Congress may legislate only to accomplish a specific
list of objectives, state legislatures may pursue a much wider—and in important
respects more fundamental—set of purposes. However, state legislatures are
limited to enacting laws to pursue the common good in which each and every
citizen partakes. Unlike the federal government, the states are charged with
securing all the individual rights of the people from being violated domestically by
their fellow citizens. Actions that violate any of the rights of others are not rightful
exercises of liberty and may justly be prohibited. For this reason, murder, rape,
robbery, theft and the like are punished by states rather than by the federal
government.
The private rights retained by the people are threatened not only by such
criminal acts as murder and theft, but by negligent and other risky conduct as well,
which are traditionally governed by the law of torts. But states do not have to wait
until after a tortious rights violation has been perpetrated. State legislatures can
“regulate” conduct in advance to prevent the tortious rights violation from
occurring in the first place. The shorthand expression to summarize the aspect of
the police power is that it includes the power to regulate for the “health and safety”
of the public. Or, as John Marshall put it Gibbons v. Ogden, “inspection laws,
quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the
internal commerce of a State” are reserved to the states. 53
However, although the police powers of a state are more general than those
of Congress, this does not mean that state legislative powers are unlimited. Such
laws must be for the common good of We the People, each and every one. As I
argued above, the “due process of law” includes an assessment by an impartial
judiciary that a particular statute was indeed a law within the powers that a people
may be presumed to have delegated to their agents in state legislatures. Like the
federal government, a state must be exercising its “just powers.”
In the absence of a specific list of enumerated powers like the ones defining
the scope of Congress’s power, how are the “just powers” of states to be identified
and protected? For one thing, the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment only protects against a person being deprived of his life, liberty, or
property. So when a government action is not depriving a person of any of these,
51

U.S. Const. art I, §9.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
53
22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824).
52

Randy E. Barnett

Popular Sovereignty and Due Process of Law

Page 13

he or she cannot object to that law in court, but must confine such objections to the
political process. When this is the case, we say such a person lacks “standing” to
sue. For example, a person cannot challenge the hours the postal service sets for its
operation or myriad other regulations of government entities.
A Due Process of Law Clause challenge, then, arises only if a government
is regulating, mandating or forbidding activity, the sanction for which is the
deprivation of the life, liberty, or property of an individual. When (and only when)
this has occurred, there is a two-step inquiry. First, is either the end or the means
employed in the statute within the “just powers” of a republican government in a
free society? In the absence of an express delegation, is it the sort of power that a
free people can be presumed to have delegated to their agents? For example, is the
purpose of the measure to protect the health and safety of the public? Or is it, for
example, “a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a
law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B”? 54
It cannot be enough that a legislature claims its acts are within one of its just
powers. Such an inquiry must include the question of whether such an assertion is
being made in good faith. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such
a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of
the land. 55
Notice how, like Chase, Marshall identifies a law “for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government” as “an act” that is “not the law of the land,”
or simply not law.
To smoke out bad faith assertions of legitimate powers then requires a
second step. Rather than directly assess the subjective motives of legislatures, a
court should ascertain whether the means employed are irrational or arbitrary with
respect to the end being asserted. For the people cannot be presumed to have
“entrusted to the government” the power to irrationally or arbitrarily restrict their
liberties. That a means employed is genuinely irrational or arbitrary with respect to
its purported end “gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some other motive
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dominating the legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health or
welfare.” 56
As the three-judge district court panel explained in Lee Optical v.
Oklahoma, the “court only can annul legislative action where it appears certain that
the attempted exercise of police power is arbitrary, unreasonable or
discriminatory.” 57 The panel then defined this traditional standard as follows: when
“the public welfare is involved, the effect of the statute must bear a reasonable
relation to the purpose to be accomplished and must not discriminate between two
similarly circumstanced groups, regulating one group but exempting the other.” 58
Although the terms “irrational” and “arbitrary” are not always clearly
distinguished, a measure that lacks “a reasonable relation to the purpose” can be
said
to
be
irrational;
a
measure
that
“discriminate[s] between two similarly circumstanced groups” can be said to be
arbitrary.
So, if the claimed purpose of a statute is a proper one, we must next ask if
the restriction on liberty is necessary to serve it. Strict logical necessity is not
required, as that type of showing would undermine the purpose for which
Republican “governments are instituted among men.” 59 But some degree of meansends fit must be shown. Such a showing helps ensure that the restrictions were
actually adopted as means to a proper end; and it guards against the very real risk
that a restriction of liberty was adopted for an improper motive. At the same time
it avoids the need for a judicial inquiry directly into the motive of particular
legislators, though it does not hurt for courts to be generally aware of how such
laws or regulations came to be. 60
Laws that are irrational or arbitrary with respect to a just power were likely
enacted to serve other improper ends or objects. Such improper ends include (a) the
end of assisting favored persons or groups at the expense of other citizens, (b) the
end of harming other individuals or groups, or (c) the end of stigmatizing or making
more costly the exercise of a liberty of which some disapprove. In the absence of
express consent, no citizen can be presumed to have consented to a lawmaking
power with any of these as its ends.
Requiring the government to identify a proper end and then show that the
means chosen are actually well suited to advance that end helps to smoke out illicit
motives that the government is never presumed by a sovereign people to have
authorized. If a law truly has an appropriate purpose, this should not be hard to
establish. Such means-ends scrutiny is rather common in our constitutional history.
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Consider the Court’s analysis of a municipal ban on the slaughter and
disposal of animals in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 61
There the City of Hialeah purported to be exercising its police power to regulate
the health and safety of the slaughtering of animals and their disposition. Clearly
regulating such activity was within its police power. But the Court expressed its
awareness of the process that led up to the enactment of the statute, in particular,
that the members of the community were offended by the sacrificial use of animals
by the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.
Still, the improper motive of suppressing the free expression of religion did
not decide the case. Instead, with this background in mind, the Court realistically
assessed the health and safety rationales advanced on behalf of the regulation and
found the restrictions to be irrational and arbitrary. It offered this quote from
Michael McConnell and Richard Posner: “[A] regulation is not neutral in an
economic sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes
greater costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities.” 62
After engaging in the realistic scrutiny of the health and safety rationales
offered on behalf of the ordinance, the Court concluded that the ordinance had
stemmed from the City’s “animosity to religion or distrust of its practices,” and
affirmed that “[T]hose in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands
and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and
regulation are secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised,
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.” 63
Of course, it was only because it was a Free Exercise case that the Court
scrutinized this economic regulation realistically to ensure it was not irrational or
arbitrary. Yet the case still exemplifies how such a realistic inquiry can be
conducted against a backdrop that suggests an improper motive without resting its
conclusion on an assessment of legislative motivation. The problem is not that such
scrutiny is infeasible, but that it is limited to a few exceptional circumstances.
Everyone now agrees that the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson 64 was wrong to
accept a mere assertion of a public purpose to justify the economic regulation of
street cars in New Orleans. But we go wrong today by limiting our skepticism to a
situations involving a few “fundamental rights” or “suspect classes.” Whenever the
enforcement of a law deprives a fellow citizen and joint sovereign of his or her life,
liberty, or property, the “due process of law” requires that such laws be skeptically
assessed by an impartial judge to ensure that they actually do serve a proper
governmental purpose. Under such an approach, a fellow citizen and joint sovereign
need not be a member of a suspect class to be protected from irrational or arbitrary
restrictions on his or her liberty.
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That this can be a very powerful way for courts to protect liberty is shown
by Clark Neily. In his book, Terms of Engagement, 65 Neily relates case after case
of special interest legislation that was enacted not to advance the general welfare
by protecting the health and safety of the public, but to benefit privileged existing
economic interests at the expense of fledgling competition. In his book, Neily tells
the stories of:
•

•
•
•

The widow who was barred from arranging flowers for a grocery store
because she lacked a license from the Louisiana Horticulture Commission,
which was staffed by licensed florists and designed to limit competition.
She died before her right to earn an honest living could be vindicated in
court. 66
The licensed massage therapist who was ordered to desist from massaging
horses because she was licensed only to provide human massage therapy. 67
The citizens who have been barred from African hair braiding without first
obtaining a cosmetology license requiring two thousand hours of training
on skills and knowledge that are entirely irrelevant to hair braiding. 68
How in Florida and two other states, one must have a college degree from
an accredited interior design school, serve a two-year apprenticeship with a
state-licensed interior designer, and pass a three-day, thousand-dollar
licensing exam before you can arrange furniture. 69

In each of these cases, the citizens were represented by the Institute for
Justice, the public interest law firm for whom Neily works as a senior attorney. In
each of these cases, the Institute showed that the public health rationale for the
restriction was either sketchy or nonexistent. And he might also have included the
story of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana who were barred
by the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors from selling
caskets without a funeral home director’s license.
In each of these cases, the prospect of vindicating the rights of the sovereign
individual through the “democratic” political process—that is, by working to elect
Democrats or Republicans to office—was entirely fanciful. The very fact that these
cases are so obscure, and involved lone citizens of modest means, prevented them
from becoming any sort of political issue in an election. How many actual elections
will ever turn on the fate of prospective flower arrangers, interior decorators, hair
braiders, horse massagers, or casket makers?
In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I proposed reversing the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of a “presumption of liberty” that would place the burden
65
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on the government to justify its restriction of liberty. 70 But the lower court opinion
in Lee Optical shows that who bears the formal burden of proof may be less
important for preserving the sovereignty of the people than that courts realistically
assess the rationality and arbitrariness of laws, even if the legislature is given the
benefit of the doubt. While the burden of proof matters—and I still favor the
government bearing the burdens of production and persuasion—what matters more
is that an individual citizen or company be allowed to meet any burden of proof
that may be imposed upon a challenger to a law.
Regardless of who bears the ultimate burden of proof, however, only by
empowering the individual to bring suit before an impartial judiciary that will
require government regulators to justify their restrictions on liberty as actually
rational can these rights be vindicated in practice. Such challenges require that
judges be realistic, not formalistic, in skeptically evaluating the rationales proffered
by the government for these restrictions. 71
Conclusion
In this symposium, Is the Modern Rational Basis Test Unconstitutional?, a
distinguished group of scholars consider whether it is a good idea to revive some
version of traditional rationality review. Some are enthusiastic about a revival, 72
some are merely open to the idea, 73 and some reject it. 74 But all consider it
thoughtfully as a serious idea.
Is this an idea whose time has come? Maybe not today, but the numerous
lower court cases invalidating irrational and arbitrary laws 75—notwithstanding the
precedent of Williamson v. Lee Optical—and Supreme Court cases using some
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form of heightened rationality review 76 suggest that such a proposal is not nearly
as radical as it may sound.
Indeed, it may simply be rational.

76

See Robert C. Farrell, Equal Protection Rational Basis Cases in the Supreme Court Since Romer
v. Evans, 14 GJLPP __, Part II (forthcoming 2016).

